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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)

LESTER WESLEY KESTER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

NOS. 46970-2019 & 47000-2019
CANYON COUNTY NOS. CR14-18-13989
& CR14-18-19904
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lester Wesley Kester pled guilty to four counts of lewd
conduct and, in a separate case, one count of lewd conduct. He received an aggregate unified
sentence of life, with thirty-one years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Kester asserts that his sentences
represent an abuse of the district court's discretion, as they are excessive given any view of the
facts.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The appeals in Idaho Supreme Court case numbers 46970-2019 (Canyon County case
number CR14-18-13989) and 47000-2019 (Canyon County case number CR14-18-19904) were
ordered consolidated for all purposes. (R.4 7000, p. 70.)
In the multiple-count lewd conduct case (No. 46970-2019), Mr. Kester was reported to
the authorities for having sexual contact with four of his children when they were under the age
of sixteen. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.)
In the case involving a single count of lewd conduct (No. 47000-2019), Mr. Kester had
sexual contact with a female relative when she was approximately age ten.

(PSI, p.9.)

Mr. Kester was interviewed, and he admitted to inappropriate sexual contact with all five
accusers. (PSI, pp.3-10.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Kester was charged by information with four counts of lewd
conduct in the first case. (R.46970, pp.30-33.) In the second case, Mr. Kester was charged with
one count of lewd conduct. (R.47000, pp.22-24.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Kester pled
guilty to five counts oflewd conduct. (11/8/18 Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.7, L.16; p.16, L.14 - p.29, L.9;
R.47000, pp.29-44.) In exchange, the State agreed not to file additional counts or charges
relating to the possession of sexually exploitative materials.

(Tr., p.67, L.24 - p.68, L.16;

R.47000, pp.33, 43.) The plea agreement required the State to limit its recommendation to six
years fixed if the psychosexual evaluation deemed Mr. Kester a low risk to reoffend and as
amenable to treatment as other offenders. (Tr., p.68, Ls.5-15; R.47000, pp.33, 43.)

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
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At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Kester to
fixed life, imposed, on each count, to be served concurrently. 2 (Tr., p.97, Ls.6-7; p.100, Ls.912.)

Mr. Kester's counsel asked the district court to sentence Mr. Kester to an aggregate

sentence oflife, with twelve years fixed. (Tr., p.105, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Kester was sentenced to life,
with thirty-one years fixed, on each count of lewd conduct.
pp.57-58; R.47000, pp.59-60.)

(Tr., p.121, Ls.1-20; R.46970,

The sentences were all ordered to be served concurrently.

(Tr., p.121, Ls.1-29; R.46970, pp.57-58; R.47000, p.59.)
Mr. Kester filed notices of appeal timely from the judgments of conviction. (R.46970,
pp.59-61; R.47000, pp.61-63, 71-75.)
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Defense counsel commented on the State's abrupt shift from recommending six years, fixed, to
fixed life:
Judge, with respect to the appropriateness of sentence, the State understood, when
they made the offer of, if he comes back as low risk to reoffend, they'd
recommend six years fixed. And that's - that's a fair offer. And I'm not - and
what I'm about to say is not meant to be ornery, be mean, to be critical, except as
my representation of Mr. Kester. But to go from knowing the facts that are
known - and even when the new charge regarding [the female relative] came up,
the offer didn't change. And so, either, one, it was an insincere offer with
knowledge that there's no way he's going to come back as a low risk to reoffend,
or two, it was seen as something that was possible and reasonable even in light of
all the facts that the State knew, which most of the facts that are in the
presentence report.
(Tr., p.103, L.22 -p.104, L.14.)
3

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate unified sentence of life,
with thirty-one years fixed, upon Mr. Kester following his pleas of guilty to five counts of lewd
conduct?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Unified Sentence Of
Life, With Thirty-One Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Kester Following His Pleas Of Guilty To Five
Counts Of Lewd Conduct
Mr. Kester asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified sentence of life,
with thirty-one years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). In
reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry regards four
factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

Mr. Kester does not allege that his sentences exceed the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by an exercise of reason, Mr. Kester must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,
294 (1997). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of

4

society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Kester's sentences are excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Kester has no prior criminal history. (PSI, p.14.) The Idaho Supreme Court has
"recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual
criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73
Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971));
see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).

Mr. Kester does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation. Mr. Kester
has a good relationship with his wife of twenty-six years, who was sentenced to ten years, with
four years fixed, and a retained jurisdiction after being convicted of felony injury to child
relating to her failure to report Mr. Kester to the authorities upon learning of his conduct
approximately seventeen years ago. 3 (PSI, pp.6, 15, 44-45.) Mr. Kester had a good relationship
with his eldest son, and his brother. (PSI, p.45.) Mr. Kester is a religious man; he attends church
at least once a week. 4 (PSI, pp.14-15.) Having a solid support system to assist Mr. Kester with
his rehabilitation will prove beneficial, because although Mr. Kester was found to be a high risk
to re-offend, he was at the lower-end of that range, "meaning if he were to seriously engage in
treatment he could potentially reduce his risk to re-offend to the moderate risk range more
rapidly than most high risk sexual offenders." (PSI, pp.34, 56.)

3

Mrs. Kester did report Mr. Kester to their church, and she believed the demon that had caused
Mr. Kester to act in such a manner had left his body several years ago. (PSI, pp.4, 6.)
4
The Kesters' religious denomination does not believe in any medical care or outside
intervention. (PSI, pp.14-15.)
5

Mr. Kester left school after the eighth grade “to help my family.” (PSI, p.45.) He began
doing farm work, hauling hay. (PSI, p.46.) Although Mr. Kester has only an eighth grade
education, he has consistently been employed and has been able to provide for his family. (PSI,
pp.17-18.) Mr. Kester’s longest period of employment has been with Domino’s Pizza, where he
worked for six years. (PSI, p.46.)
Further, Mr. Kester expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.
(Tr., p.5, L.15 – p.7, L.16; p.16, L.14 – p.29, L.9; p.105, L.22 – p.106, L.7; PSI, pp.13, 16, 19,
38.) At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Kester expressed regret for his actions. (Tr., p.105, Ls.2325.) He apologized to the victims and told the court:
I hope they find it in their heart to forgive me. I’m very sorry for what I’ve done.
And I’m here to pay whatever you feel necessary. And I’m willing to take
courses or whatever you want to better – to get better and be able to be a dad to
them. I know I failed them. And I hope and pray that I can show them what a
father really should be and is.
(Tr., p.105, L.23 – p.106, L.6.) He realized that he made bad choices during this time period.
(PSI, pp.38, 49.) Mr. Kester explained the he does not “want that to happen ever again” and that
he is “not that person anymore.” (PSI, p.38.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required
when a defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595(1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App.
1991).
The issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has been
addressed in several cases. For example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition
of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.”
Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant's term of imprisonment because
the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. In Shideler,
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's recovery from his poor mental and
physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with
his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime.

Id. at 594-95.

Therefore, the Court reduced Shideler's sentence from an

indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve
years. Id. at 593.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Kester asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse and his family support, it would have imposed less severe
sentences.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Kester respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his cases be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2019.

Isl Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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